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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) have been a
source of controversy since their implementation in 1987.1 One
problem with the Guidelines is that they are not subject to rigorous
judicial scrutiny.2 A sentence can be overturned on appeal if the
sentencing judge erred procedurally or if the sentence was clearly
erroneous.3 But what happens if the Guideline itself is clearly erroneous or arbitrary? Courts evaluate claims that the Guidelines
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
under the rational basis standard, a standard which yields minimal scrutiny of the United States Sentencing Commission’s (“Commission”) decision to create the challenged Guideline.4 The Commission, like other administrative agencies, does not create perfect
Guidelines all of the time. When the Commission promulgates a
Guideline that is arbitrary and capricious, an aggrieved criminal
defendant should have judicial recourse to challenge the validity of
the Guideline and, if she prevails, to have the opportunity to be
resentenced.

1. See generally Matthew Van Meter, One Judge Makes the Case for Judgment, THE
ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/one-judgemakes-the-case-for-judgment/463380/.
2.

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490 (2011).

3.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

4. Andrew N. Sacher, Inequities of the Drug War: Legislative Discrimination on the
Cocaine Battlefield, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1159 (1997).
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The Commission was established “as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States” by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”).5 Although the Commission looks like
an administrative agency, courts have found that the Guidelines
promulgated by the Commission are not subject to judicial review
under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).6
Congress should amend the SRA to subject the Guidelines to
the more rigorous arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.7 This would ensure that the Commission engages in reasoned
decision-making when promulgating the Guidelines and would
provide a mechanism for challenging Guidelines for which the
Commission inadequately considered the purposes of the SRA or
failed to consider such purposes altogether. Part II provides a brief
history of sentencing in the U.S. and background on the formation
of the Commission. Part III shows that, although the Guidelines
have been legally “advisory” since United States v. Booker,8 they
carry enormous weight in judges’ sentencing determinations. The
current sentencing scheme is inherently a ratchet-up system, and
the presumption of reasonableness of in-Guidelines sentences from
Rita9 has strengthened the influence of the Guidelines. Part IV explains the traditional route of appellate review of a sentence for
reasonableness and rational basis review when a sentence is challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause. Part V explains
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and why it should
be applied to the Commission. Finally, Part VI shows how implementing arbitrary and capricious review of the Guidelines would
operate, and it calls for Congress to amend the SRA to allow such
review.

5.

Sentencing Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1984).

6.

See United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

7. Some critics of the U.S. Sentencing Commission have called for a new sentencing
commission that would be subject to a higher standard of judicial review. See, e.g., Kate Stith
& Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in
the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 231 (2005).
8.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).

9.

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
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II. BACKGROUND OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF
1984 AND THE SENTENCING COMMISSION
Although the Constitution does not dictate which branch of
government shall have control over the sentencing of convicted
criminals, it is well-established that Congress has the ability to set
sentencing ranges and to set limits on the scope of judicial discretion.10 The first two hundred years of the United States were characterized by judges having broad discretion in the sentence imposed and in the information that they could consider in making
the sentencing determination.11 Furthermore, prior to the SRA,
federal sentencing orders were practically unappealable if they
were within the prescribed sentencing range.12 The then-mandatory Guidelines imposed by the SRA of 1984 brought about a monumental retraction of judicial discretion in sentencing.
The Commission is an independent agency in the judicial
branch.13 The Commission “unquestionably is a peculiar institution within the framework of our Government. Although placed by
the Act in the Judicial Branch, it is not a court and does not exercise judicial power.”14 Rather, it is an independent agency that
promulgates Guidelines for the federal courts.15 Congress created
the SRA to cure two main problems in federal sentencing: first,
“the great variation among sentences imposed by different judges
upon similarly situated offenders,” and second, “the uncertainty as
to the time the offender would spend in prison.”16 The Commission’s principal purposes are:

10. William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to
§ 3553 After Booker and its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 635 (2008).
11. Id. citing inter alia 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (“No limitation shall be placed on the
information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an
offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence.”).
12.

Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440–41 (1974).

13.

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989).

14.

Id. at 384–85.

15.

Id. at 385.

16.

Id. at 366.
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(1) to establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal courts, including guidelines to be consulted regarding
the appropriate form and severity of punishment for offenders convicted of federal crimes;
(2) to advise and assist Congress and the executive branch
in the development of effective and efficient crime policy;
and
(3) to collect, analyze, research and distribute a broad array
of information on federal crime and sentencing issues, serving as an information resource for Congress, the executive
branch, the courts, criminal justice practitioners, the academic community, and the public.17
The Guidelines were intended to promote uniformity in federal
sentencing and the Commission was to act as the leading force in
efficiently reaching this objective.
In 1989, the Supreme Court weighed in on the constitutionality of the Commission and the Guidelines and granted approval of
both.18 In Mistretta v. United States, John Mistretta was indicted
for three counts stemming from a cocaine sale in the Western District of Missouri.19 Mistretta moved to have the Guidelines declared unconstitutional as violating the separation of powers doctrine, and because “Congress delegated excessive authority to the
Commission to structure the Guidelines.”20 The district court, and
later the Supreme Court, rejected these claims.21 The Mistretta

17. An Overview of the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N (last visited
Feb.
1,
2017),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/USSC_Overview.pdf.
18.

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374.

19.

Id. at 370.

20.

Id.

21. Id. at 374 (“[W]e harbor no doubt that Congress’ delegation of authority to the
Sentencing Commission is sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements.”).
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Court acknowledged that the Commission is tasked with exercising judgments on matters of policy.22 In so doing, Congress “sets
forth more than merely an ‘intelligible principle.’”23
The Court further held that the Commission “is not a court
and does not exercise judicial power.”24 Rather, it is an independent
agency under the Judicial Branch.25 In justifying the Commission’s
power to promulgate the Guidelines, the Court pointed to the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934 where Congress conferred power to the federal courts to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.26
One critique of this comparison is that it compares procedural rules
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with substantive rules under the Guidelines.27 The Supreme Court rejected the importance
of the substantive nature of the Guidelines vis-à-vis the procedural
nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.28 The Court held
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not entirely procedural because they have important effects on the substantive
rights of litigants.29 Furthermore, the Mistretta Court held that
granting the authority to promulgate Guidelines to the Commission “pose[s] no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial
Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond the constitutional bounds by uniting . . . the political or quasi-legislative
power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts.”30
Thus, Congress appropriately delegated the authority to the Commission to determine sentencing ranges for all federal crimes.31
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Scalia stated he was “at a loss to
understand why the Commission is ‘within the Judicial Branch’ in
22.

Id. at 378.

23.

Id. at 379.

24.

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 384–85.

25.

Id. at 385.

26.

Id. at 387 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2016)).

27.

Id. at 391–92.

28.

Id. at 391.

29.

Id. at 392 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)).

30.

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393.

31.

Id.
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any sense that has relevance to today’s discussion.”32 Justice Scalia
argues that the Commission is not under the judicial branch because it is not controlled by the judiciary.33 Nonetheless, the Commission’s status as a lawfully-created judicial branch agency has
remained unchanged.
III. THE GUIDELINES ARE FUNCTIONALLY MORE THAN
MERELY ADVISORY.
Before United States v. Booker, federal judges were required
to follow the Sentencing Guidelines; in other words, the Guidelines
were mandatory.34 The Court’s decision in Booker transformed the
Guidelines from mandatory to advisory.35 Although advisory in
name, the Guidelines still comprise an inherently one-way ratchetup system where sentences are frequently increased and are rarely
decreased.36 In 2007, the Supreme Court further solidified the role
of the Guidelines in sentencing determinations by creating a presumption of reasonableness for in-Guidelines sentences.37 Further,
the Sentencing Reform Act requires the sentencing judge to consider the Guidelines’ range, effectively making the Guidelines the
starting point for sentencing determinations.38 Advisory does not
appropriately describe the force and effect that the Guidelines have
on present-day sentencing determinations.
Before Booker, federal judges were bound to follow the Guidelines “unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately

32.

Id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

33.

See generally id. at 413–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

34. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (repealed 2005) (“the court shall impose a sentence of the
kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind . . .”); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 367.
35.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).

36. Frank O. Bowman III, Nothing is Not Enough: Fix the Absurd Post-Booker Federal Sentencing System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 356, 356–57, (2012).
37.

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346 (2007).

38.

See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (2012).
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taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”39 In
Booker, the Supreme Court found that the mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution and
held that the Guidelines were thereafter merely advisory.40 The
Sixth Amendment41 right to a jury trial in a criminal proceeding
means that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”42 The Booker Court held that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines violated the right to trial by jury when
judges enhanced sentences based on facts not determined by a jury
nor admitted by the defendant.43
In Booker, a jury found the defendant, Freddie J. Booker,
guilty of possession with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of
cocaine base (crack).44 Evidence was presented that Booker had
92.5 grams of crack in his duffel bag.45 The Guidelines’ range for
this offense, given Booker’s criminal history, was “not less than 201
nor more than 262 months.”46 However, in a sentencing hearing,
the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker
had possessed an additional 566 grams of crack and that he was
guilty of obstructing justice.47 From these findings, the Guidelines
mandated a range for 360 months to life imprisonment.48 Rather
than the 21 years and 10 month maximum sentence based on jury
findings of fact, the Guidelines required the judge to sentence
39.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (repealed 2005).

40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (holding that the provision of the statute making the
Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), be severed and excised).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed . . .”).
42.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).

43.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.

44.

Id. at 227.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.
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Booker to a minimum of 30 years in prison, the term ultimately
imposed by the court.49 This sentence violated Booker’s Sixth
Amendment right.50
The Booker Court cited several cases where courts have struck
down sentences outside the range supported by the jury-verdict
alone based on judge-found facts in violation of the Sixth Amendment.51 The Court declared that making the Guidelines advisory
would cure the Sixth Amendment problem.52 Judges are frequently
tasked with exercising discretion within statutory limits and this
does not raise Sixth Amendment concerns.53 The Sixth Amendment is implicated, however, when the statutory range is altered
by a finding of fact made not by the jury but by the judge.54 In turn,
in the portion of the majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer,
the Booker Court severed and excised two provisions of the Act that
made the Guidelines mandatory and thereby cured the Sixth
Amendment violations.55

49.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.

50.

Id. at 231–32.

51. Id. at 230–32 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (the application of Washington’s sentencing scheme violated the defendant’s right to have a jury find
the existence of “any particular fact” essential to the determination of punishment)); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588–89 (2002) (impermissible for trial judge to determine presence or
absence of aggravating factors warranting the death penalty under Arizona law); Apprendi,
530 U.S. at 490 (judge found that defendant’s conduct violated New Jersey’s “hate crime” law
because it was racially motivated); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 230 (1999) (holding
that the harm to the victim was an element of the federal carjacking crime that needed to be
determined by a jury).
52.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 233.

53.

See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.

54.

Id. at 466.

55. Booker, 543 U.S. at 265 (the provisions severed and excised were 18 U.S.C. §§
3553(b)(1) and 3742(e)).
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Dissenting in part, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter
and Scalia, renounced the majority’s remedy to the alleged constitutional violation.56 According to Justice Stevens, the excised provisions of the SRA were not unconstitutional.57 Booker’s sentencing
would have been rectified had the two facts—responsibility for the
additional 566 grams of crack and obstruction of justice—been
found by a jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt instead
of by the judge.58 Justice Stevens asserted, “[t]he Court’s decision
to [invalidate the provisions] represents a policy choice that Congress has considered and decisively rejected.”59 In the end, excising
the provisions won out, and the Guidelines became advisory rather
than mandatory.60
A. The Post-Booker Guidelines Still Comprise an Inherently
Ratchet-up System, and While “Advisory,” their Legal Influence
on Sentencing has been Undiminished.
Although Booker gave judges more discretion, the Guidelines
are still inherently a ratchet-up system.61 The length of sentences
has nearly tripled since the Guidelines were instituted.62 According to Professor Frank Bowman, Booker failed to change a major
problem with pre-Booker sentencing—that is, that the rulemaking
process for the Commission is designed as a one-way upward

56.

See id. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 273 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).

59.

Id. at 272.

60.

Id. at 233.

61.

Bowman, supra note 36, at 356–57.

62. Bowman, infra note 64, at 1328. From 1984 to 1990, the mean sentence imposed
for federal crimes rose from 24 months to 46 months. Id. at 1328, n.65 (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE
GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF
INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING 376 Figure 14
(1991), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/137987NCJRS.pdf). By 1993, the mean
sentence imposed increased by almost another fifty percent to 66.9 months. U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 61 Figure F (1996), http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1995/annua95.htm.
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ratchet which raised sentences often and virtually never lowered
them.63
The SRA was intended to distribute sentencing policy-making
power and to control sentencing among various national and local
actors.64 However, that power has shifted from the judiciary and
the Sentencing Commission “toward political actors in Congress
and the central administration of justice” leading to a “one-way upward ratchet. . . .”65
There are multiple ways in which the defendant’s offense level
can be increased, ultimately increasing the sentence imposed.66
First, out of the twenty subsections of Chapter Three of the Guidelines Manual that details sentencing adjustments, only two are applicable to downward adjustments of the offense level that could
lead to a lesser sentence for the defendant: § 3B1.2 “Mitigating
Role” and § 3E1.1 “Acceptance of Responsibility.”67 All the remaining adjustments under Chapter Three would result in increases to
the defendant’s offense level.68
Second, the Guidelines have an upward tendency because politicians are at the helm of sentencing policy and there is political
pressure to be tough on crime and increase criminal penalties.69

63.

Bowman, infra note 64, at 1315.

64. Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing System: A Structural
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2005).
65.

Id.

66. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3
(2015). See e.g., id. at § 3B1.1 (the defendant’s leadership role in the crime); id. at § 3C1.1
(obstructing or impeding the administration of justice); id. at §3B1.3 (abuse of a position of
trust or skill). A defendant’s sentence is determined by offense level, which represents the
seriousness of the present offense, and her criminal history category, which represents the
defendant’s disposition for criminal activity. Bowman, supra note 64, at 1324 (citing UNITED
STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4 (2005) (containing rules regarding calculation of criminal history category)).
67.

See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3 (2015).

68.

See id.

69. See Bowman, supra note 64, at 1345 (“[P]olitical forces acting on Congress are so
uniformly aligned in one direction--that of increasing penalties.”).

750

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 53

Although increasing sentencing penalties may have short-term political benefits, the long-term budgetary effects and consequences
of over-incarceration are not adequately considered by politicians
taking this stance.70
In 2005, Professor Bowman opined that Booker brought about
one key difference in sentencing as long as the Guidelines remained a guide for appellate review: “The only theoretical difference is that the guidelines will now best be characterized as presumptive rather than mandatory. The only functional difference
would be that we would still have guidelines with the force of law,
but judges would have an expanded departure power.”71
Two years later the Supreme Court confirmed Professor Bowman’s theory that upon appellate review a within-Guidelines sentence by the district court carries a presumption of reasonableness
in Rita v. United States.72
In Rita, the Supreme Court held that an appellate court may
provide a “presumption of reasonableness” to a district court sentence that “reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines.”73 In that case, Victor Rita was charged with perjury, making
false statements, and obstruction of justice for testimony he gave
to a federal grand jury in connection with a machinegun kit he had
purchased.74 Following a jury trial, he was convicted on all
counts.75 At sentencing, Rita argued for a sentence below the
properly calculated Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months for the
following reasons: his physical condition, his vulnerability in
prison, and his military service.76 The district court rejected Rita’s
arguments that the sentencing range was inappropriate and sentenced him to the low end of the range—33 months.77 Rita appealed

70.

See id. at 1345–46.

71.

Id. at 1350 (emphasis added).

72.

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 346–47 (2007).

73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 342–43.

75.

Id. at 343.

76.

Id. at 344–45.

77.

Id. at 345.
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the sentencing decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which upheld his sentence as reasonable.78
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence as reasonable and established that properly within-Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable.79 The presumption
represents the fact that “both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to
the proper sentence in the particular case.”80 “That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is
a reasonable one.”81
This reasoning is misguided, however, because the Commission does not make determinations on particular cases, rather it
prescribes Guidelines for criminal offenders in the aggregate. The
Court seems to use the logic that if two sources come to the same
conclusion, then the conclusion is given greater weight. However,
this ignores the fact that the two problem-solvers are not independent. The sentencing court’s sentence is partially, if not wholly, dependent on the Guidelines prescribed by the Commission.
Another consequence of Rita is that it grants even greater
weight to the ostensibly advisory guidelines. The within-Guidelines presumption of reasonableness strengthens sentencing
judges’ reliance on the Guidelines for fear of being overturned on
appeal. Judge Richard Posner describes the “economic theory” of
judicial behavior which “treats the judge as a rational, self-interested” individual who is striving to maximize his or her “income . .
. power, prestige, reputation, self-respect” and so on.82 As an extension of this theory, judges are reticent to be overturned on appeal.83

78.

Rita, 551 U.S. at 346.

79.

Id. at 347.

80.

Id. (emphasis in original).

81.

Id.

82.

RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 35–36 (2010).

83. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 391 (Souter, J., dissenting) (A judge is more likely to engage
in fact finding necessary to apply a within-Guidelines sentence and are less likely to apply an
outside the Guidelines sentence unless the judge has a “powerful reason to risk reversal on the
sentence.”).
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In Justice Souter’s dissent in Rita, he predicted that the presumption of reasonableness would produce within-Guidelines sentences
almost as regularly as the mandatory guidelines, thereby rekindling the Sixth Amendment defect of sentences dependent on
judge-found facts that existed pre-Booker.84
In addition, Rita’s presumption essentially nullifies a defendant’s ability to appeal a sentence for lack of reasonableness. This
is especially true in cases where the defendant seeks to challenge
the Commission’s decision to promulgate a specific Guideline as
unreasonable. Nowhere in the creation of the Sentencing Commission did Congress state that the Sentencing Commission is infallible. As such, like any other human institution, the Sentencing
Commission will from time to time make mistakes. Rita only acts
to reinforce these mistakes and as logic might predict, judges are
not eager to buck the trend even if they indeed believe that the
Commission erred in its creation of a particular Guideline.
The presumption of reasonableness perpetuates the problem
that existed pre-Booker—that a reasonable judge could often times
do nothing to impose an appropriate sentence outside of the Guidelines. The presumption worsens the problem identified by Prof.
Bowman that making the Guidelines advisory impacted very little
how often judges sentence outside the guidelines.85 Booker had little impact on giving judges the freedom to sentence outside the
Guidelines, while Rita had the effect of further confining judges to
the Guidelines. In a sense, Rita’s presumption of reasonableness
works against the Booker Court’s holding that the Guidelines are
advisory. Although not legally mandatory, the Guidelines play an
immensely significant role in federal judges’ sentencing determinations.
B. Guidelines are the Starting Point for the Court’s Sentencing

84.

Id. at 390.

85. Bowman, supra note 36, at 357–58. In FY 2010 and FY 2011, about 55% of sentences were within the Guidelines as opposed to 65% for the five years preceding Booker. Bowman, supra note 36, at 357. See also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2010 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS Tbl. N (2011); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY
QUARTERLY DATA REPORT 1, Tbl. 1 (4th Quarter Release, through Oct. 31, 2011) (54.7% of
defendants sentenced within range in FY 2011).
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Determination.
Lastly, the Guidelines are not merely advisory because they
are the required starting point in the judge’s sentencing determination. In making a sentencing determination the sentencing
judge must first consider the Guidelines.86 “[A] district court should
begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”87 This illustrates that while the Guidelines are advisory, initial consideration by the sentencing judge is
mandatory.88
In sum, many of the problems that persisted pre-Booker still
have not been resolved. Rita’s presumption that within-Guidelines
sentences are reasonable solidifies the weight that the Guidelines
play in sentencing decisions.89 Judges are required to calculate the
applicable Guideline range as a first step in sentencing, and they
are quick to avoid straying from the Guidelines in order to prevent
being overturned on appeal.90 Finally, the scheme of the Guidelines
causes sentences to be enhanced upward frequently.91 For these
reasons, the Guidelines act as a powerful force in increasing rather
than decreasing sentences.
IV. EXISTING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN SENTENCING
The first avenue of review for a defendant challenging her sentence is to claim that the sentencing court abused its discretion.92

86.

See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4).

87. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). “The sentencing judge, as a matter
of process, will normally begin by considering the presentence report and its interpretation of
the Guidelines.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 351 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 32);
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (“A district judge must include the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting consideration.”); see Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 112
(Scalia, J., concurring) (the sentencing court must take the Guidelines into consideration when
sentencing).
88.

See id.

89.

See Rita, 551 U.S. at 359.

90.

See Booker, 542 U.S. at 223–24.

91.

Bowman, supra note 36, at 356–57.

92.

Gall, 552 U.S. at 46–47.

754

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 53

The defendant can assert that the sentence imposed was procedurally inadequate, for example, by showing that the § 3553(a) factors
were not considered or that the judge gave an incomplete explanation of the sentence.93 The defendant can also claim that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.94 The abuse of discretion
challenge attacks the adequacy of the sentencing judge’s imposition of a sentence and cannot be used to challenge the Commission’s decision to promulgate a particular Guideline.95 Next, a defendant may challenge her sentence as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.96 Under this appeal,
the reviewing court will examine the challenged Guideline under
the rational basis standard.97 That is, the Guideline must be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.98
Neither of these types of judicial review permit a challenge that
the Commission acted arbitrarily in promulgating a particular
Guideline.
A. Reasonableness Review of a Sentence under the Abuse-ofDiscretion Standard
Appellate review of a sentence imposed under the Guidelines
is for reasonableness.99 Standard appellate review of a district
court’s sentence is the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.100
The reviewing court must first ensure that the sentencing court
made no substantial procedural error such as improperly calculating the applicable Guideline range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, basing a sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain
93.

See Booker, 542 U.S. at 261.

94.

Id.

95.

See generally Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).

96.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

97.

United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1994).

98.

Id.

99. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490 (2011) (citing Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 49–51 (2007)); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005) (the
standard of appellate review for sentencings is whether the sentence is “unreasonable” with
regard to the § 3553(a) factors).
100.

Gall, 552 U.S. at 56.
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the sentence imposed.101 Then, the reviewing court will consider
“the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.”102
The defendant in Gall v. United States was charged with conspiracy to distribute ecstasy, cocaine, and marijuana for his involvement in distributing drugs as a college student at the University of Iowa.103 Although the Guidelines called for a thirty to thirtyseven months sentence, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence
of probation for a term of thirty-six months.104 The judge referenced
the § 3553(a) factors and enumerated several reasons for the below-Guidelines sentence, including Gall’s voluntary withdrawal
from the conspiracy, obtaining a college degree and starting a successful business, his lack of criminal history, and family support.105
The Eighth Circuit overturned this sentence on the basis that the
district court judge did not demonstrate extraordinary circumstances for sentencing below the Guidelines.106 Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the district court’s sentence, stating that the
standard of appellate review of a sentence “inside or outside the
Guidelines range” is the abuse of discretion standard.107
B. The Rational Basis Standard of Review
When an Equal Protection challenge is asserted by a defendant sentenced under the Guidelines, all twelve circuits have reviewed the Commission’s rulemaking under the rational basis
standard.108 Under a traditional Equal Protection challenge to a
101.

Id. at 51.

102.

Id.

103.

Id. at 41.

104.

Id. at 43.

105.

Id. at 43–44.

106.

Gall, 552 U.S. at 45.

107.

Id. at 51.

108. See Andrew N. Sacher, Inequities of the Drug War: Legislative Discrimination on
the Cocaine Battlefield, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1149, 1159 (1997) (citing United States v. Then,
56 F.3d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1530 (10th Cir.
1995); United States v. Cherry, 50 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 40
F.3d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1344 (1st Cir. 1994);
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statute or rule, rational basis review requires that the statute or
rule be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.109 The rational basis standard of review is quite easy for
the government to meet. This standard does not require the Commission to use the best means to achieve its goals and even permits
decisions “based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence
or empirical data.”110
In the Supreme Court’s seminal case on rational basis review,
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, respondents Jan
Hannah and Cleburne Living Center (collectively “CLC”) filed
claims in district court alleging that a city ordinance requiring a
special permit for a group home to house mentally retarded persons violated the Equal Protection Clause.111 The Supreme Court,
applying rational basis review, held that the ordinance did violate
the Equal Protection Clause.112 The City of Cleburne listed several
purposes for requiring the special permit, all of which were rejected
by the Supreme Court.113 “[N]egative attitudes” toward the future
residents of the group home by neighboring property owners and
fears of elderly residents of Cleburne were not permissible reasons
for treating the group home differently from apartments, hotels,
hospitals, nursing homes, and the like.114 Furthermore, protecting
the group home residents from being harassed by a nearby school

United States v. Harden, 37 F.3d 595, 602 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d
709, 713 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1994); United
States v. D’Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 612 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1220
(6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 93 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1991)).
109. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); see also City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest.”).
110. United States v. Navarro, 800 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting FCC v.
Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)).
111.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 435–36.

112.

Id. at 448.

113.

Id. at 448–49.

114.

Id. at 448.
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was rejected as a valid reason for the discrimination.115 The City’s
objection that the group home was located on a 500-year flood plain
was not a sufficient reason to treat the group home differently than
a hospital or nursing home which could be located at the same site
without a special use permit.116 After thorough examination of the
city’s purported reasons for the ordinance, the Supreme Court held
that the ordinance was based on the “irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded.”117 Because the ordinance was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, it unconstitutionally violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.118
In conducting a rational basis analysis, a court must first find
the government purpose behind its decision to act.119 In U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on a challenge to an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that
prohibited participants in the program from living with persons in
the same household to whom they were unrelated.120 The express
purposes of the Food Stamp Act were found in a congressional “declaration of policy.”121 Among these were: the goal to “raise levels of
nutrition among low-income households . . . ,” “promot[ing] the distribution in a beneficial manner of our agricultural abundances . .
. ,” and to “alleviate such hunger and malnutrition . . . .”122 The
challenged disparity in classifying households with related individuals with those that had members unrelated to each other was
“clearly irrelevant” to these stated purposes.123 To uphold this clas-

115.

Id. at 449.

116.

Id.

117.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 450.

118.

Id.

119.

See Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533.

120.

Id. at 530.

121.

Id. at 533.

122.

Id.

123.

Id. at 534.
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sification, the amendment would need to serve some other legitimate government purpose.124 In analyzing the legislative history to
the amendment, the Court held that the state purpose of preventing “hippies” and “hippie communes” from taking advantage of the
program was not a legitimate government interest.125 Simply preventing a politically unpopular group from patronizing the food
stamp program does not constitute a legitimate government purpose.126 Similarly, the Court rejected the government’s argument
that the amendment was intended to prevent fraud.127 For these
reasons, the amendment failed the rational basis test and was
struck down in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.128
C. Rational Basis Applied to the Guidelines
Equal protection challenges to the Guidelines receive rational
basis review.129 Even prior to Congress reducing the disparity in
sentencing ranges between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, several circuits found that the 100-to-1 disparity passed the rational
basis test.130 Despite the disproportionate affect this disparity had
on black people, these circuits found that Congress had a legitimate government interest in prescribing harsher penalties for
crack because it is more addictive, more dangerous, and can be sold
in smaller quantities than its powder counterpart.131
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit have rejected Equal Protection challenges in the Guidelines’ treatment of

124.

Id.

125.

Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.

126.

Id.

127.

Id. at 535.

128.

Id. at 538.

129.

Sacher, supra note 108, at 1168.

130. See, e.g., United States v. King, 972 F.2d 1259, 1260 (11th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 928 (1992); United
States v. House, 939 F.2d 659, 664 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39
(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
131. See, e.g., King, 972 F.2d at 1260; Watson, 953 F.2d at 898; House, 939 F.2d at 664;
Thomas, 900 F.2d at 39; Cyrus, 890 F.2d at 1248.
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illegal reentry, § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).132 This Guideline created an enhancement of sixteen offense levels for defendants previously convicted of an aggravating felony.133 In United States v. Ruiz-Chairez,
defendant Roman Ruiz-Chairez was convicted of illegal reentry.134
He appealed his sentence on the ground that it violated the Equal
Protection Clause because the enhancement he received under §
2L1.2(b)(1)(A) was more severe than that of other felonies.135 Specifically, Ruiz-Chairez compared the severity of the enhancement
under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) with the enhancement under § 2K2.1(a)(4)
for possession of a firearm.136 Because Ruiz-Chairez was previously

132. See United States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 1992).
133.
If the defendant previously was deported, or unlawfully remained in the
United States, after—
(A) a conviction for a felony that is (i) a drug trafficking offense for
which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 months; (ii) a crime of violence;
(iii) a firearms offense; (iv) a child pornography offense; (v) a national security or terrorism offense; (vi) a human trafficking offense; or (vii) an alien smuggling offense, increase by 16 levels. . . .
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (Nov. 1,
2004),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2004/manual/CHAP24.pdf.
The Guidelines effective November 1, 2004 were in effect at the time of Ruiz-Chairez’s sentencing on March 25, 2005. See Appellant Roman Ruiz-Chairez’s Opening Brief at 2, United
States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2007), No. 05-10226, 2005 WL 3132445, at *2.
On November 1, 2016, the Sentencing Commission significantly amended § 2L1.2. Of note, the
Commission removed the sixteen-level enhancement for crimes enumerated above, replacing
it with an increase of up to four levels for prior illegal reentry offenses and an increase of up
to ten levels for prior felony convictions (other than an illegal reentry offense) based on the
term of the sentenced imposed. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2L1.2 (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2016-guidelines-manual/2016chapter-2-l-x#NaN.
134.

Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d at 1090.

135.

Id.

136.

Id.
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convicted of a “crime of violence,”137 his base offense level was increased sixteen levels to twenty-four.138 Under § 2K2.1(a)(4) for unlawful possession of a firearm, a similar prior offense would result
in an adjusted offense level of only twenty.139 In his Equal Protection claim, Ruiz-Chairez argued that this discrepancy demonstrated that the Commission acted arbitrarily and violated the
Equal Protection Clause.140 In rejecting his argument, the Ninth
Circuit held that the severity of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) did meet the rational basis standard.141 The court cursorily stated that the legitimate government interest in Ruiz-Chairez’s case was “deterring illegal reentry.”142 In offering some justification, the court quoted the
Eleventh Circuit, “[T]he Sentencing Commission may have concluded that an alien who has been convicted of a felony should be
strongly deterred from re-entering the United States, a consideration not present with respect to an American citizen.”143 This exemplifies the nature of rational basis review—there is no requirement that the Commission actually have a legitimate government
interest for its action; a speculative government interest will do.

V. THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS STANDARD OF
REVIEW
The arbitrary and capricious standard is a common standard
of judicial review of actions of administrative agencies.144 The Ad-

137. Ruiz-Chairez’s previous conviction of a drug-trafficking offense also warrants the
enhancement under the Guidelines. Id.
138.

Id.

139. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.1(a)(4)
(Nov. 1, 2004), http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/2016-guidelines-manual/2016-chapter-2-lx#NaN.
140.

Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d at 1090.

141.

Id. at 1091.

142.

Id. at 1092.

143. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Adeleke, 968 F.2d 1159, 1160
(11th Cir. 1992)).
144.

See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2016).
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ministrative Procedure Act (APA) prescribes this standard as a default standard of review in certain instances.145 Section 706(2)(A)
of the APA states, “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and
set aside any agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be .
. . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law. . . .”146 The arbitrary and capricious standard
has two functions. First, it is the standard of review of the factual
basis for certain agency decisions, including informal adjudications
and informal rulemaking.147 Second, the arbitrary and capricious
standard applies to judicial review of the overall rationality of the
agency decision.148 The latter requires the reviewing court to determine if the agency considered all relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.149 In other words, the
agency must engage in reasoned decision making.150 An agency ruling would be arbitrary and capricious:
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the

145.

See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966).

146.

Id. (emphasis added).

147. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 (1971)
(the APA defines both “rule” and “order.”); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4), (6) (1966) (a rule derives
from “rule making” and an order derives from an “adjudication.”); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54 (1966)
(the APA specifies unique procedures for both actions and determining whether Congress
granted the agency the authority to engage in rulemaking or adjudication is an often source of
debate and litigation. The Supreme Court created a framework for determining if an action is
rulemaking or an adjudication.); see Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373
(1908); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. St. Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). This Comment will
not distinguish between the Commission’s actions as rules or orders.
148.
(2013).

Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416; see also RICHARD SEAMON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 845–46

149.

Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416.

150.

Id.; SEAMON, supra note 148, at 845.
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agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.151
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. involved the rulemaking decisions
of the Secretary of Transportation under the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.152 The purpose of the Act was to
reduce injuries and deaths due to traffic accidents.153 The Act
tasked the Secretary of Transportation with establishing mandatory motor vehicle safety standards—in other words, the Act
granted the Secretary of Transportation informal rulemaking authority.154 It also directed the Secretary to consider “relevant available motor vehicle data” and the extent to which the proposed
standards would promote the purposes of the Act.155 The Secretary
of Transportation delegated this authority to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), an agency in the
Transportation Department.156 The NHTSA issued the rule “Modified Standard 208,” which provided that all new vehicles during
model years 1982–1984 would be equipped with either automatic
seatbelts or airbags, giving the manufacturer the choice of which
to install.157 This standard was promulgated in part because the
NHTSA found that providing these passive restraints “could prevent approximately 12,000 deaths and over 100,000 serious injuries annually.”158
In February 1981, after a new presidential administration
came to power, the rulemaking process was reopened and the pas-

151. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
152.

Id. at 33; 15 U.S.C.A § 1381 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980) (repealed 1994).

153.

Id.

154.

Id. at 33, 41.

155.

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1392(f)(1), (3), (4) (repealed 1994)).

156.

Id. at 34 n.3.

157.

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 37.

158.

Id. at 35.
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sive restraint requirement of Modified Standard 208 was rescinded.159 The question for the Supreme Court was whether revoking parts of Modified Standard 208 was arbitrary and capricious.160 The Secretary gave the following reasons for rescinding
the passive restraint requirement: (1) the automobile industry
planned to install seatbelts 99% of the time so the effects of airbags
could not be realized;161 and (2) the seatbelts could be easily detached leaving the existing problem with manual belts that users
must take some affirmative action.162 Accordingly, the agency concluded that there was no longer a basis for predicting that usage of
passive restraints would be significantly increased.163 This line of
reasoning led the Court to find that the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious.164 First, the agency failed to consider requiring the use of airbags as part of the standard.165 Second, “the
agency was too quick to dismiss the benefits of automatic seatbelts.”166 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that only a
justifiable excuse not to seek further evidence on this issue would
render it non-arbitrary.167 In sum, the agency’s decision to rescind
the passive restraint requirement was not the result of reasoned
decision-making, and was therefore arbitrary and capricious.168

159.

Id. at 38.

160.

Id. at 34.

161.

Id. at 38.

162.

Id. at 38–39.

163.

Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 39.

164.

Id. at 46.

165.

Id.

166.

Id. at 51.

167.

Id.

168.

Id. at 52.
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Professor Richard Seamon has summarized the requirement
of reasoned decision-making.169 First, the “agency’s reasoning process must be rational and comprehensible.”170 Second, the agency
must consider all relevant factors.171 Third, the agency should not
base its decision on irrelevant factors.172 Fourth, there should be “a
clear, logical connection between the agency’s factual determinations and its ultimate decision.”173 And fifth, the agency’s action
must be consistent with prior agency action unless the agency adequately explains its change of course.174
A. The Guidelines are not Subject to Arbitrary and Capricious
Review
A rule promulgated by an administrative agency is typically
subject to a challenge in federal court pursuant to Chapter 7 of the
APA.175 In other words, a party aggrieved by an agency action can
seek judicial review of the agency action.176 The Supreme Court
has a long-standing tradition of permitting judicial review.177
Nonetheless, two circuit courts have held that the Sentencing Commission’s decisions are not subject to the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review.178 Instead, the D.C. Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress did not intend for

169.

SEAMON, supra note 148, at 838–39.

170.

Id. at 838.

171.

Id.

172.

Id.

173.

Id.

174.

Id. at 839.

175.

See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966).

176.

Id.

177.

See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).

178. See United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Andrade
v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 989 F.2d 308, 309 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Freedom of
Information Act (“FOIA”) and the APA do not apply to the Commission).
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certain provisions of the APA, including the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review, to apply to the Sentencing Commission.179
In United States v. Lopez, the defendant, Clarence Morales—
charged under the name José Lopez—received a 51-month sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine
base.180 On appeal, Morales made several claims alleging the trial
court erred in determining his sentence.181 First, Morales claimed
that the sentencing judge erred in refusing to grant a downward
departure based on his age and background.182 Second, Morales argued that not considering his age violated due process.183 Third,
and most importantly for the purposes of this article, Morales challenged § 5H1.1 of the Guidelines “on the basis that the Sentencing
Commission had failed to explain why a defendant's youth should
not ordinarily be taken into account by the sentencing court.”184
The then-current version of § 5H1.1 stated that age is “not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside
the guidelines. . . .”185 As to Morales’s first claim, the court found
that the district court judge did not abuse his discretion in finding
that there lacked a showing that this case was extraordinary
enough to consider age.186 Similarly, the court cursorily disposed of
the due process claim.187
As for Morales’s claim that the Sentencing Commission failed
to give adequate reasons for declaring that age is ordinarily not
relevant, the court determined that it lacked authority to review

179.

Id.

180.

Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1294–95.

181.

Id. at 1295–96.

182.

Id. at 1296.

183.

Id.

184.

Id.

185. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
5H1.1 (Nov. 1, 1987) (amended 2010)).
186.

Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1294.

187.

Id. at 1296 (citing United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 539–40 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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the adequacy of the Commission’s basis, or rationale, for promulgating such Guidelines.188 The court reasoned that “well-settled
Administrative Law principles” have limited applicability to this
case.189 These “well-settled Administrative Law principles” refer to
the idea that the default rule for administrative agencies is that
agency actions can be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious
standard.190 Instead, the court held that Congress did not intend
for the Commission’s actions to be subject to judicial review under
the APA.191 This determination of Congressional intent was twofold: first, by subjecting the Commission to one section of the APA,
Congress impliedly excluded the applicability of all other provisions of the APA to the Commission; second, the legislative history
confirmed that Congress did not intend for the judicial review provisions of the APA to apply.192
Regarding the first point, the Lopez court held that § 994(x) of
the SRA determines the extent to which the APA applies to the
Commission and the Guidelines.193 This section states: “The provisions of section 553 of title 5, relating to publication in the Federal
Register and public hearing procedure, shall apply to the promulgation of guidelines pursuant to this section.”194
Applying the canon of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the
court concluded that by subjecting the promulgation of the Guidelines to this one provision of the APA, “Congress affirmed that the
Commission's rulemaking was not subject to any other provision of
the APA, including those for judicial review.”195 The Eighth and
Ninth circuits have followed this line of reasoning.196

188.

Id. at 1297.

189.

Id.

190.

See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).

191.

Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1297.

192.

Id.

193.

Id.

194.

28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (2012).

195.

Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1297.

196. See, e.g., Andrade v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 989 F.2d 308, 309 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Congress intended that the Commission be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act and
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Next, the Lopez court held that the legislative history on §
994(x) of the SRA confirms that Congress did not intend the Commission to be subject to judicial review under the APA.197 The court
quoted the following language of the Senate Committee Report:
[Section 994(x)] is an exception to the general inapplicability of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . to the judicial
branch.
....
It is . . . not intended that the guidelines be subject to appellate review under chapter 7 of title 5. There is ample provision for review of the guidelines by the Congress and the
public; no additional review of the guidelines as a whole is
either necessary or desirable.198
This Senate Committee Report convinced the D.C. Circuit that
Congress did not intend to subject the Commission to all of the provisions of the APA. Accordingly, Lopez established that the Guidelines are not subject to judicial review under the APA, and by extension, are not held to the arbitrary and capricious standard of
reasonableness.
The Ninth Circuit similarly held that the APA does not apply
to the Commission except to the extent to which § 994(x) applies.199
In Andrade v. U.S. Sentencing Commission, the plaintiff brought
suit in order to compel the Commission to comply with a Freedom
of Information Act (“FOIA”) request.200 The FOIA is part of the
APA; because Congress spoke to the specific provisions of the APA
which apply to the Commission in § 994(x), it implicitly exempted

the provisions of the APA not mentioned in § 994(x)); United States v. Johnson, 703 F.3d 464,
468 (8th Cir. 2013).
197.

Lopez, 938 F.2d at 1297.

198.

Id. (citing S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 180–81 (1983)).

199.

Andrade, 989 F.2d at 309.

200.

Id.
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other provisions of the APA, including the FOIA, from applying.201
Although Andrade does not speak directly to the judicial review
provisions of the APA, following the court’s reasoning that only §
994(x) applies would yield the same result.202
The Eighth Circuit has held that it didn’t have the authority
to review the Commission’s reasoning for issuing a policy statement.203 In United States v. Johnson, Defendant Johnson appealed
his sentencing on various grounds, including a claim that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously.204 Johnson was convicted of “conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine
base (crack cocaine), . . . and for distribution of and possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base.”205 Johnson challenged “the Commission's decision not to make Amendment 742 retroactive . . . .”206
If Amendment 742 was retroactive, Johnson’s criminal history category would have decreased by one level.207
At his original sentence date in 2005, Johnson’s criminal history category level was VI.208 This level was partially increased because of § 4A1.1, which adds criminal history points to the defendant when the instant crime is committed in a short time after the
defendant’s release from prison on a former crime.209 On November
1, 2010, the Commission issued a policy statement establishing

201. Id.; see also United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1013 (3d Cir. 1988) (because
the Commission is housed in the judicial branch, it is exempt from certain statutes, including
FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
202.

See Andrade, 989 F.2d at 309.

203. Johnson, 703 F.3d at 467. For the purposes of this article, a policy statement
advising how a Guideline should be applied carries similar force and effect as a Guideline created by the Commission.
204.

Id.

205.

United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 947, 949 (8th Cir. 2006).

206.

Johnson, 703 F.3d at 467.

207.

Id. at 466.

208.

Id.

209. Id.; see U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
4A1.1(e) (2004).
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Amendment 742, which eliminated these recency points.210 The
court determined it did not have the authority to review the Commission’s decision to issue this policy statement, denying Johnson’s
claims.211
VI. A CALL FOR CONGRESS TO MAKE THE GUIDELINES
SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Agencies are not perfect. The Sentencing Commission is not
perfect. This is why there needs to be meaningful judicial review of
the Guidelines passed by the Commission. When a rule is passed
without proper consideration, or with no consideration, of the relevant factors set out in the SRA, a party aggrieved by the rule—
most typically a sentenced defendant—should have a meaningful
opportunity to challenge the rule as arbitrary and capricious.212
This would force reviewing courts to provide a meaningful review
of the Commission’s decision-making process. The appellate courts
are uniquely capable of reviewing the Sentencing Commission’s decisions because these courts routinely exercise review of criminal
sentencings. This is unlike many other administrative agency actions where the courts might not have expertise in the substance
of the agency action.
To institute arbitrary and capricious review of the Guidelines,
Congress should create a special review provision that can be incorporated in the SRA. “The APA was meant to bring uniformity
to a field full of variation and diversity.”213 “Some facets of an administrative decision, because they raise issues within the courts'
area of competence, are well suited to judicial oversight.”214 The
standard of judicial review of an agency action will depend on the
210.

Johnson, 703 F.3d at 466.

211.

Id.

212. Congress would make the determination of who has standing to challenge the
rule. If the APA language is followed, a person “adversely affected or aggrieved by an agency
action” would be the standard for standing. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). A defendant sentenced
under the alleged arbitrary Guideline would undoubtedly have standing.
213.
214.
Cir. 1979).

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999).
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C.
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agency’s competence in the area.215 Some facets of administrative
decisions are suitable to stringent judicial oversight, while others
require more deference to the agency’s decision.216
Many existing statutes provide the standard of judicial review
that applies to agency rulemaking or adjudications. One example
is the judicial review provision of the Consumer Product Safety
Act, which states “The . . . safety rule shall not be affirmed unless
the Commission’s findings . . . are supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole . . . .”217 Another review statute subjecting agency rulemaking to judicial review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is 5 U.S.C. § 7703, which regulates
the Merit Systems Protection Board.218 The statute reads:
In any case filed in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the court shall review the record and
hold unlawful and set aside any agency action, findings, or
conclusions found to be—
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .219
The language under subection (1) is identical to that of the APA,
which also calls for arbitrary and capricious review.220 The APA
states: “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law . . . .”221
As these statutes demonstrate, courts are accustomed to this
kind of language and this type of judicial review. Because the problems with the Guidelines identified in Part IV warrant heightened

215.

See id. at 1049.

216.

Id. at 1049–50.

217.

15 U.S.C. § 2060(c) (2016).

218.

5 U.S.C. § 7703 (2016).

219. Id. For another example of a statute that has a special review provision calling
for the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial review, see 30 U.S.C. § 1276(a)(1) (2012).
220.

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).

221.

Id. (emphasis added).
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review,222 Congress should amend the SRA and create a special review statute to that affect. An example of the review statute would
be as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 999. Judicial Review
(a) Any person adversely affected by a rule or order promulgated by the Commission, may file a petition with the
Court of Appeals within the district that such party resides,
or with the Court of Appeals within the district that the
sentence was imposed.
(b) The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside
any action by the Commission found to be—
(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not
otherwise in accordance with law.
(c) This section is not intended to modify or supersede any
other provision under this Act, including § 994(x).223
A. The Proposed Standard Would Enable Courts to Meaningfully
Review the Commission’s Rationale
Creating the above special review provision would alleviate
problems caused by arbitrary Guidelines. First, it would require
reviewing courts to determine if the Commission engaged in reasoned decision-making in promulgating the Guidelines. The SRA
conveniently states the purposes of the Commission and the Guidelines, and the Commission would be forced to consider these purposes in its decision-making. Furthermore, this provision would
force the Commission to state its reasons behind certain Guidelines, bringing a long-awaited and much-needed level of transparency to this enigmatic judicial branch agency. In theory, this record-keeping requirement will promote cautious and well-reasoned
decisions by the Commission.
Under the proposed amendment, the reviewing court would
first look to see if the Commission considered the relevant factors
when creating the Sentencing Guidelines. The relevant factors to
be considered were mandated by Congress in the SRA in two main

222.

See supra Part IV.

223.

Subsection (c) avoids overlapping or inconsistent language in the SRA.
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places.224 First, Congress gave the purposes to the Commission in
28 U.S.C. § 991(b):
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission
are to—
(1) establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that—
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set
forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code;
(B) provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes
of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences
when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not
taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
justice process; and
(2) develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional practices are effective in
meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code.225
The second source of relevant factors the Commission must
consider, as mentioned twice in the language of § 991(b), are the
§ 3553(a)(2) factors. These factors are the following:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

224.

See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012).

225.

28 U.S.C. § 991(b).
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(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. . . .226
Under the proposed statute the reviewing court would ask
whether the Commission adequately considered the purposes of §
991(b) and the § 3553(a)(2) factors.227 To meet the former, a Guideline must meet the following purposes: avoid unwarranted disparities in the Guidelines while maintaining flexibility in sentencing
when necessary. To meet the latter, the Guideline must reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote deterrence, protect the public
from future crimes, and promote rehabilitation.
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Review Applied to Ruiz-Chairez and
Johnson
Applying arbitrary and capricious review would have a significant impact on the reviewing court’s analysis in Ruiz-Chairez.
Most importantly, the government would not be able to sit back
and enjoy the free pass it received under the rational basis test.
Rather, the government would be required to demonstrate the
Commission’s reasons for the discrepancy of the adjusted offense
levels between the crimes of illegal reentry and felon in possession
of a firearm. Specifically, the government would have the burden
of demonstrating that the Commission properly considered the
purposes of sentencing set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2). The Ruiz-Chairez court stated that the defendant’s
argument that a felon in possession of a firearm is inherently more
dangerous than illegal reentry “misses the point.”228 Perhaps, this
comparison misses the point in considering whether the illegal
reentry Guideline satisfies the rational basis standard, but such a
comparison would be critical in determining if the Commission
acted arbitrarily when it created the Guideline. Indeed, this argument addresses an alleged unwarranted disparity in the Guidelines. If a court subsequently determines that § 2L1.2 created an

226.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

227. The author does not claim that this is the most useful description of the relevant
factors the Commission may consider, but it is a good start for combatting arbitrary Guidelines.
228.

United States v. Ruiz-Chairez, 493 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2007).
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unwarranted disparity, the Guideline would be struck down as arbitrary and capricious.
Furthermore, the court would review the decision to implement the sixteen offense level enhancement with respect to the relevant § 3553(a)(2) factors. If the reviewing court were to find that
the Commission did not consider the relevant factors in determining the offense levels, then the challenged enhancement could be
invalidated as arbitrary and capricious. The sixteen offense level
enhancement does deter illegal reentry, and it arguably protects
the public from future crimes because the defendant will be behind
bars for longer. However, a court reviewing the Guideline may determine that the steep enhancement is out of proportion with the
seriousness of the offense, does not serve to protect the public from
the future crimes of the defendant (because the defendant’s crime
is merely remaining in the U.S.), and does not provide the defendant with rehabilitative, educational or vocational treatment.229 For
these reasons, the government may fail to meet its burden that the
Commission engaged in reasoned decision-making in promulgating the Guideline.
Next, looking at United States v. Johnson under the proposed
standard, a reviewing court would look to the Commission’s rationale behind Amendment 742, and specifically, the Commission’s
rationale for denying the Amendment retroactive effect. The reviewing court would first ask whether the Commission considered
the purposes under § 3553(a)(2) in denying retroactivity. The reviewing court would take a close look and inquire: Would such denial reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the
law, and provide just punishment for the offense?
In these examples, the hypothetical outcomes are uncertain.
However, creating judicial review of the Sentencing Commission
would have positive effects. First, instituting the proposed amendment would expose the thought processes of the Commission. It
would also shift the burden to the government to defend the Commission’s actions. The special review provision would increase the
level of scrutiny of the reviewing court on the actions of the Commission, forcing the reviewing court to take a close look at the disputed Guideline. In turn, this would incentivize the Commission to
act cautiously in promulgating the Guidelines and to justify any

229. The absence of promoting rehabilitation is especially prevalent given the fact that
deportable aliens are ineligible for the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) and halfway
house programs. See FEDERAL BURUEAU OF PRISONS, DEFENDER SERVICES OFFICE TRAINING
DIVISION 7, https://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---bop/fed_bop_merchant.pdf (Feb. 15, 2017).
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actions in terms of the purposes of the SRA and the purposes of the
Commission. Increasing transparency will improve the public perception that the Guidelines are fair. Lastly, the judicial review provision would act as a backstop for human errors which the Commission is bound to commit.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines are in need of a backstop
to prevent arbitrary Guidelines from remaining in effect. The Supreme Court has given little credence to claims that the Guidelines
are arbitrary because, since Booker, judges are not required to sentence within the Guidelines. Rational basis review offers minimal
scrutiny to the Guidelines. At present, the Commission may pass
arbitrary Guidelines without considering the purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act or the § 3553(a) factors. If created, an arbitrary
Guideline could have a significant impact on sentences imposed by
judges and it would carry a presumption of reasonableness on appeal if the sentence is imposed within the Guideline range. Advisory or not, the influence of the Guidelines is both real and substantial.
By amending the SRA to include arbitrary and capricious review of the Guidelines, an arbitrary Guideline would be struck
down. This standard is currently applied to agency actions of administrative agencies subject to the judicial review provisions of
the APA, meaning courts are capable of applying the same standard to the actions of the Sentencing Commission. Hapless defendants would cease to bear the brunt of the Commission’s failure to
exercise reasoned decision-making. Ultimately, this check on the
Commission would restore faith in the fairness of federal sentencing.

